Electricity water & sewage
Desk Study on the Environment in Iraq
This Desk Study has been prepared by UNEP as a contribution to tackling the immediate postconflict humanitarian situation in Iraq, and the subsequent rebuilding of the country’s shattered infrastructure, economy and environment. It is intended for a wide audience and includes information likely to be of value to many of the stakeholders involved in shaping the future of Iraq.
The study focuses on the state of Iraq’s environment against the context of decades of armed conflict, strict economic sanctions and the absence of environmental management principles in national planning
Attention is drawn to possible next steps, including urgent measures to minimize, mitigate and remediate immediate environment-related threats to human health (e.g. from disrupted or contaminated water supplies, and from inadequate sanitation and waste systems). Suggestions are also made for wider measures, including field missions at an early stage to address the key environmental vulnerabilities and risks identified, and to prepare appropriate action plans, including clean-up and risk reduction measures. At the time of writing (22 April), restoring law and order is a key priority and a prerequisite for dealing effectively with humanitarian and environmental problemsAttention is drawn to possible next steps, including urgent measures to minimize, mitigate and remediate immediate env
The Role of "Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities" in Halting One Genocide and Preventing Others
First we analyze a Defense Intelligence Agency document (or more precisely the declassified portion of that document). At one extreme this document, "Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities" (hereafter IWTV) is nothing more than an innocent military intelligence work product, simply asserting that conditions A, B, and C will produce results X, Y, and Z. At the other extreme, IWTV is an early blueprint for genocide against the people of Iraq-- a genocide that has selectively targeted for extermination by contaminated water the very young, the very old and the very ill.
SPECIAL REPORT: WATER UNDER SIEGE IN IRAQ
US/UK Military Forces Risk Committing War Crimes by Depriving Civilians of Safe Water
Water is fundamental to life. No one can survive without sufficient water for drinking, cooking, washing, and general hygiene. For this reason, international law recognizes access to safe water as a basic human right—“indispensable for leading a life in human dignity”—as well as an integral component of the rights to life, health, and housing.[8]
The current invasion ofIraqby theUnited States,United Kingdom, andAustraliaposes a grave threat to the right to water ofIraq’s 24 million inhabitants, almost half of them children under the age of 15.[9] Anglo-American military forces have already laid siege to numerous urban centers in southern and centralIraq, disrupting electrical, water and sanitations systems that sustain millions of civilians.[10] With the approach of summer, when temperatures in this region regularly exceed 120 degrees Fahrenheit,[11] the likelihood of water-borne disease epidemics is alarmingly high.[12]
Iraq Country Analysis Brief
GENERAL BACKGROUND
In the aftermath of war in March and April 2003, Iraq now finds itself in a period of uncertainty and transition after more than three decades of Ba'ath party rule. The events of 2003 mark the latest upheaval which Iraq has faced in its recent history. During the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, Iraq experienced two major wars (Iran-Iraq and the Kuwait war of 1990/1), plus more than a decade of economic sanctions. As a result, the country's economy, infrastructure, environment, health care system, and other social
indicators all deteriorated sharply.
Iraq also assumed a heavy debt burden, possibly as high as $116 billion if debts to Gulf states and Russia are counted, and even more if $250 billion in reparations payment claims stemming from Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait are included. It is possible, however, that much of Iraq's debt will be written off in the end, and that reparations will be capped at a certain level, possibly around $40 billion. In December 2003, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was sent as an envoy to several of Iraq's major creditor nations, attempting to secure pledges to write off some of Iraq's debt. Russia stated that it would be willing to write off part or all of the $8 billion it is owed in exchange for favorable consideration for Russian companies on Iraqi oil and reconstruction projects. In January 2004, Kuwaiti Prime Minister al-Sabah announced that his country would be willing to waive some of the $16 billion owed by Iraq, and would help reduce Iraq's overall foreign debts as well
UNITED NATIONS / WORLD BANK JOINT IRAQ NEEDS ASSESSMENT
1.2 Overall Description of Situation
1.2.1 In 1990 prior to the Gulf War, the total installed generating capacity was 9,295MW with a peak demand of about 5100 MW. Approximately 87% of the population had access to electricity. A combination of wars, sanctions, looting and vandalism has however severely affected the entire power system infrastructure in Iraq. During the 1991 Gulf War the electricity system suffered severe damage. Several transmission lines were put out of service and substations were damaged. However, the power generation equipment was the most severely affected. The available capacity was reduced to 2,325MW and power cuts of up to fifteen hours or more were common. In some areas there was no supply at all. Three 132kV interconnections to the three northern Governorates were removed and these Governorates were isolated from the national grid. Erbil and Sulaimaniya had to rely on supply from the hydro power stations at Dokan and Derbandikhan. Dohuk was able to obtain limited power from Mosul.
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GENERAL BACKGROUND
In the aftermath of war in March and April 2003, Iraq now finds itself in a period of uncertainty and transition after more than three decades of Ba'ath party rule. The events of 2003 mark the latest
upheaval which Iraq has faced in its recent history.
During the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, Iraq experienced two major wars (Iran-Iraq and the Kuwait war of 1990/1), plus more than a decade of economic sanctions. As a result, the country's economy, infrastructure, environment, health care system, and other social indicators all deteriorated sharply
Rewiring a State
Rewiring a State
The Techno-Politics of Electricity in the CPA's Iraq
by Nida Alahmad
The Coalition Provisional Authority, the US-British body that briefly ruled in Baghdad from May 2003 to June 2004, had grand ambitions for Iraq. The idea was to transform the country completely from what was basically a command economy (notwithstanding liberalization measures in the 1990s) into an open market and from a dictatorship into a liberal democracy. The radical nature of these plans and orders, coupled with the CPA’s swift dissolution, has led many to dismiss the body as a hasty and ill-conceived imperial experiment. Indeed it was -- and a destructive one as well. But the CPA period still deserves serious examination. It was the only time when the US, in its capacity as occupier, was in charge of Iraq administratively and legally. (Britain always played a secondary role.)
The Techno-Politics of Electricity in the CPA's Iraq
The Bush administration foresaw the problem with the Iraqi electricity supply -- but not the extent of the damage that would be caused by post-invasion looting. On January 20, 2003, President George W. Bush issued a directive founding the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), housed in the Department of Defense and charged with post-war Iraq under retired Gen. Jay Garner. In the early morning hours of April 13, four days after the fall of Baghdad, a 28-member ORHA team arrived in the Iraqi capital. Their official name was Joint Task Force 4, but they called themselves Task Force Fajr (Dawn, in Arabic). Task Force Fajr was in charge of restoring the flow of electrical power to hospitals, then to water treatment plants and sewer systems, then to households, and finally to business and factories. At dawn on the day they arrived, the task force met with Iraqi engineers who knew Baghdad’s power system. Prior to the occupation, Iraq had produced 4,000 megawatts of electricity per day.
TURN A LIGHT ON: ELECTRICITY SECTOR REFORM IN IRAQ
The core dynamic of Iraq’s electricity crisis is simple: an ever-widening gap between supply and demand. There is no accurate estimate for actual demand due to its suppression by institutional and economic constraints on consumption and the lack of accurate historical data since the 1990s. In two recent studies, though, the authors have estimated demand at anywhere between 50 and 70 percent higher than originally anticipated by the ministry’s Master Plan (Fig. 1), taking into account factors
such as shifting demographics and suppressed demand.8 Total peak demand is likely to reach anywhere between 50,000 to 60,000 MW by 2030 while the ministry forecasts peak demand as a mere 35,000 MW.9 In additionto continuous population growth (Fig. 2), the substantial jump in GDP growth after 2003, mainly due to the increase in crude oil prices, has contributed to the increase in the demand for electricity
(JOINT IRAQ NEEDS ASSESSMENT Electricity
1.2.1 In 1990 prior to the Gulf War, the total installed generating capacity was 9,295MW with a peak demand of about 5100 MW. Approximately 87% of the population had access to electricity. A combination of wars, sanctions, looting and vandalism has however severely affected the entire power system infrastructure in Iraq. During the 1991 Gulf War the electricity system suffered severe damage. Several transmission lines were put out of service and substations were damaged. However, the power generation equipment was the most severely affected. The available capacity was reduced to 2,325MW and power cuts of up to fifteen hours or more were common. In some areas there was no supply at all. Three 132kV interconnections to the three northern Governorates were removed and these Governorates were isolated from the national grid. Erbil and Sulaimaniya had to rely on supply from the hydro power stations at Dokan and Derbandikhan. Dohuk was able to obtain limited power from Mosul.