Electricity water & sewage
Desk Study on the Environment in Iraq
This Desk Study has been prepared by UNEP as a contribution to tackling the immediate postconflict humanitarian situation in Iraq, and the subsequent rebuilding of the country’s shattered infrastructure, economy and environment. It is intended for a wide audience and includes information likely to be of value to many of the stakeholders involved in shaping the future of Iraq.
The Role of "Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities" in Halting One Genocide and Preventing Others
First we analyze a Defense Intelligence Agency document (or more precisely the declassified portion of that document). At one extreme this document, "Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities" (hereafter IWTV) is nothing more than an innocent military intelligence work product, simply asserting that conditions A, B, and C will produce results X, Y, and Z. At the other extreme, IWTV is an early blueprint for genocide against the people of Iraq-- a genocide that has selectively targeted for extermination by contaminated water the very young, the very old and the very ill.
SPECIAL REPORT: WATER UNDER SIEGE IN IRAQ
Iraq Country Analysis Brief
UNITED NATIONS / WORLD BANK JOINT IRAQ NEEDS ASSESSMENT
IRAQ Background | Oil | Natural Gas | Electricity | Profile | Links | Chronology
Rewiring a State
The Techno-Politics of Electricity in the CPA's Iraq
The Bush administration foresaw the problem with the Iraqi electricity supply -- but not the extent of the damage that would be caused by post-invasion looting. On January 20, 2003, President George W. Bush issued a directive founding the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), housed in the Department of Defense and charged with post-war Iraq under retired Gen. Jay Garner. In the early morning hours of April 13, four days after the fall of Baghdad, a 28-member ORHA team arrived in the Iraqi capital. Their official name was Joint Task Force 4, but they called themselves Task Force Fajr (Dawn, in Arabic). Task Force Fajr was in charge of restoring the flow of electrical power to hospitals, then to water treatment plants and sewer systems, then to households, and finally to business and factories. At dawn on the day they arrived, the task force met with Iraqi engineers who knew Baghdad’s power system. Prior to the occupation, Iraq had produced 4,000 megawatts of electricity per day.